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Abstract
Quantum foundations is a field of diverse goals and methods. In this thesis, I will
present three different approaches to quantum foundations, each emphasizing a different
goal or perspective. The causaloid framework has the goal is to use insight from quantum
foundations to study quantum gravity. Ontic models are a tool used to study realist theories
of quantum mechanics from an operational quantum information perspective. Nelson’s
mechanics is a derivation of the Schrodinger equation using the machinery of stochastic
mechanics.
As each of these approaches has different set of goals, they are suited to different
purposes and have different limitations. From the causaloid, I construct the concept of
causally unbiased entropy and at the same time, find an emergent idea of causality in
the form of a measure of causal connectedness, termed the Q factor. In the ontic models
framework, I reproduce the generalization of the concept of contextuality. For Nelson’s
mechanics, I examine its relationship to Bohmian mechanics - a realist formulation of
quantum mechanics.
I will then examine the relationship of these different approaches to one another. From
this examination I will introduce the concept of physical contextuality in order to ask
whether contextuality could be more than just a mathematical artifact. I also include a
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The study of the foundations of quantum mechanics has existed in one for or another for
more than 75 years[7]. In that time the goals of the subject have varied significantly, with
some programs even working counter to others[4, 5, 22, 8, 3, 33, 27, 29]. Though these goals
are mostly reflective of the philosophies of the researchers that work on these subjects, it is
not always the case that the framework used in research is chosen through this bias. It is for
this reason that it is prudent to examine whether there is the potential for consolidation
of approaches or at the least the transfer of knowledge between them. For this reason
we will examine different approaches to quantum foundations including their motivations,
their applications and their descriptions of reality. We will then examine whether the
opportunity to build bridges between these subjects exists and the implications of looking
for such connections.
From the attempts to create a comprehensible realist interpretation of quantum me-
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chanics we have gained insight into what distinguishes quantum mechanics from the clas-
sical world. One such attempt - due to Nelson [22] - proposed that the departure from
classical physics was unnecessary, instead demonstrating that the Schrodinger equation
(the principle equation of quantum mechanics) can be derived from the theory of Brown-
ian motion. Though Nelson’s Mechanics was an early candidate in a line of attempts to
give a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, it still remains one of the canonical
examples in the study of quantum foundations. In section 1.1 we present the derivation
of this theory. Then in section 2.4.2 we will compare this theory with another realist
interpretation of quantum mechanics due to Bohm[4, 5].
One of the advances of the modern study of the foundations of quantum mechanics is
the unification of different approaches to quantum mechanics which share commonalities.
Combining approaches in this way allow us to determine which properties are invariant
under the assumptions on which the theories differ, and in doing so develop tools with
which to study them. One example of this method is the development of the ontic models
framework (see for example [12]). In section 1.2 we will present this framework. Then in
section 2.2 we will use this framework to illustrate the concept of contextuality and its
generalizations, and in section 2.3 we will present the concept of deficiency within this
framework and discuss its relations with contextuality.
Though fundamentally quantum foundations is concerned with trying to understand
quantum mechanics, it can also take a broader vision which include looking at how quan-
tum mechanics can interface with other things we know about reality. One such interface
that is cause for concern is that with general relativity. General relativity possesses a very
different structure from quantum mechanics mostly owing to differences in their treatment
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of the causal structure of space-time, and this discord is reflected in the difficulty of con-
structing a theory of quantum gravity[30]. To this end the causaloid [10, 11] framework
was constructed in order to study what would happen if we attempted to generalize how
we treat quantum mechanics to allow for a more general causal structure. We will present
the causaloid framework in section 1.3. We will also present a means of constructing a
concept of entropy in such a framework in section 2.1.
The rest of this thesis will take the form of an evaluation of whether the lessons from
each of these different approaches to quantum foundations can be applied to the others. To
that end we will discuss the compatibilities and incompatibilities of these frameworks and
from these discussions we’ll further examine the idea of whether the concept of contextuality
has a physical meaning (in section 3.1.1).
1.1 Nelson’s Mechanics
In [22], Nelson attempted to construct a realist model of quantum mechanics. The attempt
assumes that the trajectories of particles can be described by a modification of classical
mechanics. This modification is based upon the assumption that whatever real processes
lead to quantum mechanics averages out to give a noise-like modification to the classical
dynamics proportional in magnitude to Planck’s constant. This theory, referred to as
Nelson’s Mechanics is cast in the language of stochastic processes. The central result of
[22] is in constructing the wave function in this language and demonstrating that it is a
solution to the Schrodinger equation. Though foundational, the derivation in [22] is not
fully rigorous and has some gaps. In the following sections we will tighten the derivation
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in [22], while filling in the details missing from the calculations.
1.1.1 Stochastic Mechanics
We will first build the machinery to study classical mechanics with stochastic processes.
Since we will be dealing with processes that are not necessarily differentiable, we must













If the mean forward derivative and the mean backward derivative are equal, then the
process is differentiable. We will use these to study Brownian motion with friction in a
potential and kinematics of Markoff processes, which we will later use to produce quantum
mechanics from Brownian motion.
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Brownian motion with friction in a potential
From Newton’s second law, we know that the acceleration ~K of a particle of mass m due
to a potential V is given by
m~K = −∇V (1.3)
A frictional force is dependent not on the position of a particle, but instead on its velocity.
We use mβ for our coefficient of friction, with β what is commonly termed the drag co-
efficient (to reflect that the frictional force is due to a particle moving through a space
rather than along a surface).
We then get Langevin equations of the form
dx(t) = dv(t)dt (1.4)
dv(t) = −βv(t)dt+ ~K(x(t))dt+ d ~B(t). (1.5)
We have also introduced a Wiener process ~B(t) - a purely diffusive term - where d ~B is a
Gaussian with




Here kB is the Boltzmann constant, and the constant T arises from the assumption that for
a distribution of such systems, we would assume the distribution to arise from a Maxwell-
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Boltzman distribution characterized by a temperature T . In requiring causality and by the
nature of randomness, we also get
〈(d ~B(t))x(s)〉 = 0 ∀ s ≤ t (1.8)
〈d ~B(t)v(s)〉 = 0 ∀ s ≤ t. (1.9)
Clearly, these equations are asymmetric in time. We impose time symmetry by defining
d ~B?(t) such that
〈d ~B?(t)x(s)〉 = 0 ∀ s ≥ t (1.10)
〈d ~B?(t)v(s)〉 = 0 ∀ s ≥ t. (1.11)
We then get the Langevin equation
d~v(t) = β~v(t) + ~K(~x(t)) + d ~B?(t). (1.12)
Applying the definitions of the mean forward and backward derivative we have that - as
~x(t) is differentiable -
D~x(t) = D?~x(t) = ~v(t) (1.13)









As d ~B appears in the Langevin equation for ~v(t) linearly, we then have that ~v(t) is not
differentiable.
Examining ~B we see that as ~B(t + ∆t)− ~B(t) is independent of the pair ~x(t), ~v(t) for
∆t > 0, and has mean 0. This implies that
D~B(t) = 0. (1.16)





















〈d ~B〉 = −β~v(t) + ~K(~x(t)), (1.20)
where we’ve used the fact that the mean of the Wiener process is 0. In the same way we
can extract from the Langevin equation obtained from the Wiener process ~B?
D?~v(t) = β~v(t) + ~K(~x(t)). (1.21)
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We now can consider a free particle - where ~K = 0. In this situation we have that
D~v(t) = −D?~v(t) = −β~v(t). (1.22)




we know that the velocity tends towards 0 for either choice of time direction.
Returning again to a system with a potential, we can combine equations 1.22 and 1.23























(DD?~x(t) +D?D~x(t)) . (1.27)
We then get the generalization of Newton’s second law in Ornstein-Uhlenbeck theory: The
8
mean acceleration is equal to the external force divided by the mass of the particle.
~F = m~a (1.28)
Kinematics of Markoff Processes
For a sufficiently large time scale compared to the relaxation time (characterized by β−1),
we can describe the Brownian motion of a free particle in a fluid by a Wiener process ~w(t).
The Wiener infinitesimals are mutually independent Gaussians with












We can then further introduce an external force to the scenario, or equivalently, a current
within the fluid by introducing a time dependent vector field ~b (~x(t), t). This would give
us an equation for the position vector of our particle of the form
d~x(t) = ~b (~x(t), t) dt+ d~w(t) (1.32)
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Like in section 1.1.1, we have that the d~w(t) are independent of the previous positions
(~x(s) with s ≤ t):
〈d~w(t)~x(s)〉 = 0 ∀ s ≤ t (1.33)
This gives us that our mean forward velocity is solely due to the current
D~x(t) = ~b(~x(t), t). (1.34)
Again, in the same form as section 1.1.1 we define a backward Wiener process d~w?, with
〈d~w?〉 = 0. (1.35)
We also have that the backwards Wiener process is independent of the future positions:
〈d~w?(t)~x(s)〉 = 0, ∀ s ≥ t. (1.36)
This allows us to have the Langevin equation from the backward Wiener process:
d~x(t) = ~b? (~x(t), t) dt+ d~w?(t). (1.37)
This gives us the mean backward velocity:
D?~x(t) = ~b? (~x(t), t) . (1.38)





































+∇2 (νρ) . (1.42)
Proceeding instead with the backward derivative instead of the forward changes our equa-
























−∇2 (νρ) . (1.45)
We can take an evenhanded approach between the forward and backward equations by








With this we can combine the forward and backward Focker-Planck equations to get
∂ρ
∂t
= −∇ · (~vρ) . (1.47)
We now consider the Taylor expansion of a function f of the position ~x and the time t:




(d ~x4 · ∇4)2 f
]
~x4
+ . . . (1.48)
where we’ve used the subscript 4 to denote that we’re taking the infinitesimal both with
respect to the position and the time, but without the relativistic implications of the
d’Alembertian. Defining the infinitesimal of the function f to be
df = f( ~x4 + d ~x4)− f( ~x4). (1.49)
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where we’ve dropped higher order terms (including second order terms in time).









+~b · ~∇f + 1
2
〈dw2〉∇2f. (1.52)




+~b · ~∇f + ν∇2f. (1.53)









+~b? · ~∇f − ν∇2f. (1.55)
We now observe the following: as ρ is a probability density its integral across all of
space is 1 and so its distribution across space-time is invariant. From [21] we can then






+~b · ∇+ ν∇2 (1.56)
B = − ∂
∂t
−~b? · ∇+ ν∇2 (1.57)





We contrast this to the standard adjoint - which we’ll denote by a † - with respect to the











+~b · ∇+ ν∇2
)†
ρ = − ∂
∂t
−~b? · ∇+ ν∇2. (1.60)
Multiplying from the right by ρ−1 and applying both sides to the trivial function, we can
use the definition of the adjoint as being left acting to find
∂ρ−1
∂t







ρ−1 + ν∇2ρ−1. (1.61)
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= (∇ρ) ·~b+ ρ∇ ·~b, (1.66)
and likewise for ~b?. We now recall that both of ~b and ~b? are currents of a fluid, and that
they should thus be divergence free, allowing us to eliminate the second term in the right










Using left cancelation of the gradient we reach
− 2ρ~b+ 2ν∇ρ = −ρ~b− ρ~b?, (1.68)
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which we rearrange to give us









































= ∇ · (~uρ− ν∇ρ) (1.74)
Which under left cancelation would give us equation 1.71 again. Equation 1.71 can also
be written
~u = ν∇ (ln ρ) . (1.75)
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We now proceed to calculate the time derivative of ~u:
∂~u
∂t











Using the continuity equation -
∂ρ
∂t
= −∇ · (~vρ) (1.78)














(∇ρ (∇ · (ρ~v)))− 1
ρ2




∇ (∇ρ · ~v) + 1
ρ
(∇ρ) (∇ · ~v) + 1
ρ






∇ρ (∇ρ · ~v) + 1
ρ
∇ (∇ρ · ~v) +∇ (∇ · ~v)
)
(1.81)
= −ν∇ (∇ · ~v)−∇ (~v · ~u) . (1.82)
where in the last step we’ve used that











(~v · ∇ρ) + 1
ρ




∇ρ (~v · ∇ρ) + 1
ρ
∇ (∇ρ · ~v) . (1.85)
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With all of these results we can finally approach our goal in this section; to relate the




































































~u∇̇+ ~v · ∇
]
(~v − ~u) + 1
2




− (~u · ∇) ~u+ (~v · ∇)~v − ν∇2~u. (1.91)
Where we remind the reader that
~b = ~u+ ~v (1.92)
~b? = ~v − ~u. (1.93)
18
We can then rearrange to get
∂~v
∂t
= ~a(t) + (~u · ∇) ~u− (~v · ∇)~v + ν∇2~u, (1.94)
which is our final result of this section.
1.1.2 Using Brownian Motion to Model Quantum Mechanics
To model quantum mechanics through Brownian motion we will make a set of assumptions
based upon what we know from the study of quantum mechanics. First we choose our
diffusion co-efficient in such a manner that we achieve classical mechanics in both the high
mass limit and the limit as we take another constant (we’ll use ~ for reasons that should





We assume that the particle moves in a frictionless fluid (either vacuum or a frictionless
ether), so as not to contradict our inability to detect a preferred reference frame. This
means that the Brownian motion will not be smooth and that velocities will not exist.
We describe the motion with a Markoff process in co-ordinate space, subject to dynamics
arising from from Newtonian dynamics
~F = m~a. (1.96)
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− (~v · ∇)~v + (~u · ∇) ~u+ ~
2m
∇2~u. (1.98)
From this we can fully determine ~u and ~v given a set of initial distributions ~u(~x(t), t0) and
~v(~x(t), t0).
Real Time-Independent Schrodinger Equation
We consider a force arising from a potential
~F = −∇V. (1.99)




and from equation 1.98 we get that
∇V
m
= (~u · ∇) ~u+ ~
2m
∇2~u. (1.101)
As ~u is a gradient field - and the curl of a gradient is zero - we get
(~u · ∇) ~u = 1
2
∇ (~u · ~u) . (1.102)
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Likewise, we also get
∇2~u = ∇ (∇ · ~u) . (1.103)























(∇ · ~u) (1.105)
where E is a constant with dimensions of energy. We can multiply across this by mρ and








(∇ · ~u) ρd3x =
∫
V ρd3x− E. (1.106)
We now perform a quick manipulation:




























Integrating both sides we can drop the first term by using Gauss’s divergence theorem and
the conservation of probability, giving us
∫
(∇ · ~u) ρd3x = −
∫
~u · ∇ρd3x. (1.110)
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(~u · ∇ρ) d3x =
∫
V ρd3x− E. (1.111)
Returning again to the same term we have
~
2


















As ρ is a probability density, E then has an alternate interpretation as the expectation
value of 1
2
m~u2 + V .



















From this we say that R is the real potential associated with m~u~ . We can make a change
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of variables from ρ to ψ seemingly inspired by this fact and Born’s rule to get
ψ2 = ρ (1.117)
ψ = eR. (1.118)
We then have that
m~u
~
= ∇ (lnψ) = ∇ψ
ψ
, (1.119)































= V − E (1.121)
−~2
2m
∇2ψ + V ψ = Eψ (1.122)
- to reach the time independent Schrodinger equation.
The Time-Dependent Schrodinger Equation
Now - in place of the assumptions of the previous section - we attempt to construct a more
general solution to equations 1.97 and 1.98. To do this, we make the assumption that





We now propose - as an ansatz - that
ψ = eR+iS (1.124)







∇2ψ + V ψ. (1.125)















Substituting in to the left hand side of the equation we get
−~2
2m





ψ [∇ (R + iS)]2 + ψ∇2 (R + iS)
]






(∇R)2 − (∇S)2 +∇2R + i
(
2∇R · ∇S +∇2S
)]
+ V ψ. (1.130)
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Dividing through both sides by ψ and taking the gradient of both sides we get that our
























































− ~F . (1.134)










while comparing the imaginary parts gives us
∂~u
∂t
= −∇ (~u · ~v)− ~
2m
∇2~v. (1.136)
These two equations are the same as equations 1.97 and 1.98, which arose from the study of
a particle subject to a potential and Brownian motion. This completes the derivation: we
have demonstrated the existence of a method for finding the solutions to the Schrodinger
equation through solutions to a stochastic process. It is then possible that such a process
could be the underlying physics behind quantum mechanics, or at the least an effective
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description of some underlying theory.
1.2 Ontic Models
The study of realist theories of quantum mechanics has progressed significantly from its
origins. Rather than considering specific models of underlying physical structures and
laws, research has instead focused on constructing general frameworks which include all
such models so that the common properties of these theories can be studied. The ontic
models framework is such an attempt, assuming nothing about the underlying ontic state
space other than its existence. In what follows we shall present this framework.
We will use the notation from [12]. We begin by introducing an ontic state space Λ, we
will then introduce epistemic states µ which are probability distributions over Λ - which
reflects our inability to know the true ontic state. We will also allow our epistemic state to
depend on the method which we use to prepare our state, SP . We thus write the epistemic
state as µ (λ| SP ), and we impose the requirement that there must be at least one ontic
state which describes the system (along with normalization of probability) by requiring
that ∫
Λ
dλµ (λ| SP ) = 1. (1.137)
We then introduce the measurement which we allow to depend on the procedure with which
the measurement is taken - the exact form of this dependence within a model will reflect
whether or not the model is contextual in the traditional sense. Additionally, we allow for
the possibility that the ontic states still give probabilistic predictions for measurements.
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For a given measurement procedure SM , with outcomes indexed by a parameter k, we give
a probability distribution for the measurement by ξ (k| λ, SM), where ξ is the probability
that for a given ontic state λ we will get the kth measurement outcome for our procedure.
We then require that this distribution is normalized by saying
∑
k
ξ (k| λ, SM) = 1. (1.138)
We can then extract probabilities of outcomes for experiments by combining these two
quantities. ∫
µ (λ| SP ) ξ (k| λ, SM) dλ = Pr (k| SP , SM) (1.139)
This gives us probabilities of measurement outcomes only in terms of preparations and
measurement procedures, given the assumption of an underlying ontic model.
In [12] this model was explored further and given context in terms of an operational
understanding, its relation to quantum mechanics and how to have the ontic framework
represent different concepts. Here we will present their perspectives on how to understand
this framework.
The operational understanding of the ontic models framework comes with taking it to
describe a system S. The preparation method SP then corresponds to having S interact
with a preparation device P (with macroscopic settings we still label with SP ). After this
the system S then interacts with a measurement device M which records an outcome based
on the state S and the measurement settings SM . This gives us a picture of how to relate
the ontic models framework to experiments and the physical world.
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We can use these operational definitions to relate this framework to standard quantum
mechanics. To do this we first observe that the result of a system interacting with the
preparation device in quantum mechanics is a density matrix, which we’ll label ρSP . We
then take the measurement process as giving a POVM effect Ek with k indexing the
outcome, corresponding to SM . (Note: A POVM (positive operator valued measurement)
is a set of positive semidefinite, self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space such that the
sum over the elements of the set is the identity.) To have consistency between quantum
mechanics and the ontic models framework we impose matching with the Born rule:
Pr (k | SP , SM) = tr (EkρSP ) . (1.140)
The form of the ontic state space Λ reflects the individual ontic theory that we are
describing with the framework. An example of this is if we consider the possibility of the
wave function being the complete description of reality then Λ would be the projective
Hilbert space of the wave functions. In this case the epistemic state takes a simple form of
µ (λ | ψ) = δ (λ− λψ) , (1.141)
where λψ is just the assignment of ψ to the space Λ. If ψ were instead an incomplete
description of reality then we could decompose Λ into the projective Hilbert space together
with supplementary variables which complete the description. If the wave function only
represents the state of our knowledge - and not anything real - then the Λ cannot even
be decomposed into the projective Hilbert space of the wave function together with other
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variables.
We can also discuss properties of a model that are encoded outside of the structure of
Λ. One such property is outcome determinism. In section 1.2 we allowed for probabilistic
predictions for measurements. If we instead require that each λ gives a completely deter-
mined outcome for a given preparation and measurement we have an outcome deterministic
theory. In the language of the ontic models framework we do this by requiring that for any
k,λ and SM that
ξ (k | λ, SM) ∈ {0, 1} . (1.142)
The last point to be made from the observations in [12] is that though ontic models
typically treat the preparation system P and measurement system and M as external to
the theory it is possible to instead treat them as part of the system described by the
ontological space. This description is equivalent to treating them externally provided we
satisfy three assumptions:
• Separability: The global ontic space Γ is the Cartesian product of the ontic spaces
of the three systems S,P and M :
Γ = ΛP × ΛS × ΛM , (1.143)
where ΛS is the ontic space that we’d previously called Λ.
• Statistical independence: The effect of the preparation device’s ontic state is medi-
ated through S. That is to say that M and P must be statistically independent of
29
one another.
• Measurement: The measurement outcome must depend on the measurement settings
rather than the particular ontic state of the measurement device.
Provided these requirements are satisfied, an ontological description of the preparation and
measurement systems is equivalent to the standard picture.
1.3 The Causaloid Framework
In Newtonian physics, physical processes are understood with respect to a fixed spatial
coordinate system and a time parameter, which is absolute and ever increasing. Predictions
are entirely deterministic. Quantum theory and general relativity depart from this classical
picture in opposing manners. Quantum theory gives probabilistic predictions as to the
outcomes of measurements, but retains fixed space and time coordinates. On the other
hand, general relativity is deterministic, but shows that space and time form a dynamical
structure. Reconciling these fundamental philosophical differences is one of the many
challenges one is faced with in trying to construct a theory of quantum gravity. There
have been many different approaches to this problem with many different results [28, 13,
31, 35, 33, 1]. One way of moving forward is to dismiss classical assumptions and create a
probabilistic theory that has a dynamic causal structure. However, what results is indefinite
casual structure. This is more radical than either probabilistic predictions or dynamical
space-time structure. In general relativity, a separation between space-time locations is
either space-like or time-like. An indefinite causal structure would allow for a separation
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between space-time locations to be something like a quantum superposition of a space-like
and a time-like separation. While we may be uncertain of the causal structure of the
path between measurements, we know where in space-time we make measurements, what
measurements we have made, and what outcomes we get. With this data, we can examine
probabilistic correlations for information. The causaloid framework [9, 10, 11] which we
outline below provides us with the necessary tools to examine an indefinite causal structure.
1.3.1 The Picture
Every experiment results in a set of data from making measurements on a system. Each
piece of data could be thought of as a card with three indications on it; where the measure-
ment is made in space-time, what is measured, and what the result of the measurement is.
We will represent each card (or piece of data) as (x, fx, yx) where x denotes the space-time
location, fx represents the apparatus configuration, and yx denotes the outcome of the
measurement. The set of all possible cards (i.e. all possible measurements with all possible
outcomes with every space-time configuration) is denoted V . We can imagine running
an experiment an infinite number of times so as to be able to obtain relative frequencies.
(Note that the concept of relative frequencies is utilized here only has a illustrative tool
and is not meant to specify an ontology.) In order for the cards to tell us the relative
frequencies, we must systematically sort them.
Each distinct x is defined as an elementary region of space-time. A composite region,
denoted O1, is a set of elementary regions. (Note: These definitions of “elementary region”
and “composite region” differ from those in [9, 10, 11].) Therefore, these cards can be sorted
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according to their associated space-time region. The set of all possible cards with the same
space-time location x on them is the elementary information set. We denote this set as
Rx. The composite information set, R1, is the union of all elementary information regions






Note that a composite information set has no more or less structure than an elementary
region of space-time. Therefore, without adding structure or losing generality, we can treat
the sets Rx as elementary regions. From this point forward, the term region will be used
interchangeably to refer to objects of type x or O1 and type Rx or R1.
If we chose a particular measurement to perform in the region x (indexed by αx), the






{(x, fαxx , yx)} (1.145)





For the measurement fαxx , the set of cards consistent with the outcome y
αx
x is called the
outcome information set and is denoted Y αxx
Y αxx ≡ {(x, fαxx , yαxx )} (1.147)
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The set of all measurement and outcome pairs (i.e. all α = (Y, F) ) is denoted Υ.






So V is the largest of all regions that can be considered.
These definitions provide a firm foundation on which the causaloid framework rests
both mathematically and conceptually.
1.3.2 First level physical compression
The most basic quantity that we would want to be able to calculate is the probability
that a certain (set of) outcome(s) is observed given that a certain (set of) measurement(s)
has been performed at a (set of) location(s) in space and time. Suppose that the set of
locations we are interested in is O1. Then the information set of interest is R1. The set
comprised of all the cards not in R1 is V − R1. We call (YV−R1 , FV−R1) the generalized
preparation because it is the information that surrounds R1 not only from the immediate
past, but from the future and the rest of space-time as well. By the choices we make in
setting up the experiment, we can put conditions on the generalized preparation such that
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Prob(YV |FV ) is well-defined. (See Ref.[9] for details.) Then we can write
Prob(YV |FV ) = Prob(Y1, YV−R1|F1, FV−R1) (1.150)
For a specific pair α1 ⇔ (Y α11 , Fα11 ), we can write this probability as
Prob(Y α11 , YV−R1|Fα11 , FV−R1) (1.151)
We use the short-hand pα1 to denote the probability defined in Eq.(1.151). One way to




 α1 ∈ Υ1 (1.152)
However, this over-specifies the state. We do not usually need to know the probability of
every outcome of every measurement in order to determine what the complete state of the
system is. Physical theories tell us what relationships exist between variables and what
constraints those relationships place on the variables of the system. These relationships
and constraints can be used to determine a reduced set of probabilities from which all
other probabilities can be represented. The reduced set of probabilities is defined such
that any probability can be written as a linear combination of the probabilities in the
reduced set. Let us denote the reduced or fiducial set in R1 as Ω1 ⊆ Υ1. This process
of going from the set of all the probabilities to the smallest essential set we call first level
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 l1 ∈ Ω1 ⊆ Υ1 (1.153)
such that
pα1 = rα1 · p (1.154)
where rα1 encodes the physical compression and therefore, is determined by the details of
the physical theory. Of course, the compression is not unique. We can define a decompres-








means the l1 component of rα1 . While the decompression matrix may seem
superfluous at the first level, it becomes a useful notation for higher level compression.
1.3.3 Second level physical compression and the causaloid prod-
uct






2 , YV−R1−R2|Fα11 , Fα22 , FV−R1−R2) (1.156)
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 α1α2 ∈ Υ1 ×Υ2 (1.157)













 l1l2 ∈ Ω1 × Ω2 ⊆ Υ1 ×Υ2 (1.159)
This is effectively first level compression on each index. But if a physical theory has
some connection between the two regions, Ω1 × Ω2 may no longer be the smallest set
that is sufficient to represent all possible states. Then second level physical compression is






 k1k2 ∈ Ω12 ⊆ Ω1 × Ω2 (1.160)
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such that







When Ω12 = Ω1×Ω2, second level compression is trivial. But it is proven in [10] that it is
possible that Ω12 ⊂ Ω1 × Ω2.
Now we can define a second level decompression matrix. By comparing Eq.(1.158) and
















which is the desired second level decompression matrix. This matrix encodes how we















This defines the causaloid product, denoted rα1 ⊗Λ rα2 which unifies the different causal
structure-specific products. Explicitly,
rα1 ⊗Λ rα2 = rα1α2 (1.165)
It is this product that allows us to look at the probabilistic correlations between arbitrary
locations in space-time without specifying the causal relationship.
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We have shown second level compression for the case where we have two regions. This is
easily generalized for any number of regions. The object that would encode the compression
for three regions would be Λk1k2k3l1l2l3 , for four regions would be Λ
k1k2k3k4
l1l2l3l4
, etc. After second








There is a third level of physical compression that compresses these multi-region Λ-matrices
to give the Causaloid, Λ, which is defined as
Λ ≡
(
{Λ} | {Λ} ⊆ {Λk1α1 ,Λ
k1k2
l1l2
, . . .}
)
(1.167)
where {Λ} is determined by the rules of the physical theory (for detailed discussion of how
this works see [2]). By decompressing the set {Λ}, we can obtain the Λ-matrix for any set
of regions. This means that the Causaloid gives us the ability to perform any calculation
that the physical theory allows for.
1.3.4 Well-defined probabilities
Up to this point we have exclusively dealt with probabilities conditioned on procedures. It
is more useful to also be able to condition on outcomes. Specifically, we’d like an expression
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for the following:
Prob(Y α22 |Y α11 , Fα11 , Fα22 ) (1.168)
Using Bayes’ Theorem, this becomes
Prob(Y α22 |Y α11 , Fα11 , Fα22 ) =
Prob(Y α11 , Y
α2






Prob(Y α11 , Y
β2
2 |Fα11 , Fα22 )
(1.169)
where Y β22 ∼ Fα22 denotes that the sum is over all possible outcomes corresponding to the
measurement Fα22 (in R2). (For simplicity, we have suppressed the part of the notation
denoting the generalized preparation.) In the causaloid framework, this becomes







rα1β2 . (The sum being over β2 in this notation has the same meaning
as the sum being over all outcomes consistent with F2.) In order for this probability to be
considered well-defined, the right hand side cannot depend on V − R1 − R2. Since rα1α2
and rα1_2 are determined exclusively by the physical theory, neither has any dependence
on V −R1 −R2. However, p does depend on V −R1 −R2. This implies that in order for
the probability Eq.(1.170) to be well defined (i.e. not depend on V − R1 − R2), it must
not vary with p. The dependence on p can be removed altogether by requiring that rα1α2
be parallel to rα1_2 . Therefore, the above probability is well defined if and only if
rα1α2 ‖ rα1_2 (1.171)
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With this condition, we get





Consider two distinct regions; RA and RP . By definition
rαAαP = rαA ⊗Λ rαP
rβAαP = rβA ⊗Λ rαP
Suppose we wanted to take the dot product between two vectors of the above form. Using
decompression matrices, we can write




























































































Using this, Eq.(1.173) becomes

















where kAkP ∈ ΩAP and lAl′A ∈ ΩA ×ΩA. This suggests that the essence of rαAαP · rβAαP is
a relationship between rαA and rβA mediated by matrices that depend on rαP . Therefore,
we can view Eq.(1.173) as kind of product of rαA and rβA . Dot products of this form come
up frequently enough that we will define this as the Γ-dot product and denote it as











Discussions of the Applicability of
the Models
Equipped with the three frameworks from chapter 1 we now set about to demonstrate
that each of these frameworks can be applied to make progress. Each of these frameworks
are very different in their structure and their intent, and so each is suitable for studying
different problems. With this in mind we will focus here on the applications to which each
framework is well suited rather than pushing them beyond their natural capabilities.
The causaloid framework is a probabilistic framework without a fixed causal structure.
The result of creating such a framework is that we lose contact with many of the quantities
that allow us to have a physical intuition with which to interpret results. One such quantity
that we lose contact with is entropy: the second law of thermodynamics is in particular
intertwined with the notions of causality and time, and so it will require effort to reconnect
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with it. In section 2.1 I introduce the concept of causally unbiased entropy in an effort to
produce a quantity which will allow us to gain a physical intuition for the framework.
The ontic models framework similarly has difficulties connecting its internal statements
to reality due to its high level of abstraction. Despite this, the ontic models framework is
very good at making statements about general properties of measurements. Due to this
capability of the model it is the ideal framework to address the concept of contextuality
- a property of the results of measurements to depend on the choice of what other mea-
surements have been performed at the same time. In section 2.2 we will reproduce both
the original idea of contextuality due to [16] and its extensions from [34]. Additionally in
section 2.3 we will discuss the concept of deficiency from [12] and present a way of relating
it to contextuality.
Nelson’s mechanics has a very different character than the ontic models framework or
the causaloid framework, instead being very definite in its form: dealing with trajectories
rather than abstract states. For this reason, Nelson’s mechanics can be used to examine
an alternate set of questions from the other frameworks. In section 2.4.1 we will introduce
Bohmian mechanics - another realist theory of quantum mechanics - and then in section
2.4.2 we will compare the construction of Bohmian mechanics to that of Nelson’s mechanics.
2.1 Entropy in the Causaloid
The content of this section is a result of a collaboration with Lucien Hardy [18].
It is natural in discussions of causal structure to raise the question of entropy. The
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second law of thermodynamics tells us that in an isolated system, entropy can increase or
remain the same, but it can never decrease [17]. In information theory, entropy is viewed
as being a measure of uncertainty before we measure a state or equivalently, the amount
of information gained by upon learning the state of a system [23]. As is the basis for other
work [19, 14, 15] we shall take an equivalence of these two types of entropy. Inherent
in this concept of entropy is an assumed causal structure, specifically that there exists a
background time[30]. The standard definition of entropy is in the context of a definite
causal structure with reference to absolute time. In order to make sense of entropy in
an indefinite causal structure, a clear definition must be established. To do so requires
consideration of the following questions:
What are the concepts from the usual picture of entropy in a definite causal
structure that are necessary to define entropy? What are the analogues to these
concepts in a picture with indefinite causal structure?
Using the formalism introduced in section 1.3, we are able to provide answers to these
questions and then, define a causally-unbiased entropy.
Standard definitions of entropy assume fixed causal structure. Here we develop a
causally-unbiased definition of entropy in the causaloid formalism.
44
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: (a) Fixed causal structure (b) Indefinite causal structure
2.1.1 The picture





The definition of pi used in this equation requires that the structure of space-time be
organized with the following features:
• a region of interest, A
• an immediate past space-time region, P
• sufficient data about what happened in P
• a measurement FA
• a set of outcomes, {Y iA}, corresponding to FA
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This allows us to write
pi = Prob(Y
i
A|FA, dataP ) (2.2)
Removing all time bias from these features of space-time structure, we get
• a region of interest, A
• a reference region P
• an outcome/measurement pair in P , {αP} = {(FP , YP )}
• a measurement FA
• a set of outcomes, {Y iA}, corresponding to FA
The reference region can be thought of as a kind of preparation region that is not limited
to being in the causal past. In fact, the choice of reference region is arbitrary as illustrated
in Fig. 2.1b.
The definition of pi in a causally-unbiased structure is
pi = Prob(Y
i
A|YP , FP , FA) (2.3)
(Since P is arbitrary, we should technically say ‘pi with respect to the reference region P ’.
However, for the sake of brevity, we will assume that ‘with respect to P ’ is implied much
as ‘with respect to the past’ is taken as implied in the causally-biased situation.)
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Using the above definition of pi, we define the entropy relative to the reference data




Prob(Y iA|YP , FP , FA) log2
(
Prob(Y iA|YP , FP , FA)
)
(2.4)
Notice that this reduces to the causally-biased definition of entropy when P is the past; FA
measures the microstate in the classical case or measures in the basis where ρ̂ is diagonal
in the quantum case.
2.1.2 In the causaloid framework













Of course, this equation requires that rαAαP ‖ r_AαP . We can also consider what hap-
pens when rαAαP is nearly parallel to r_AαP , using the definition of the probability from














It becomes necessary to shorten the notation for the following work so rαAαP will be denoted
as vi (where the index αA is represented by i) and r_AαP will be denoted as u. As
with any vector, vi can be decomposed into a component parallel to u and a component
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‖ + v⊥i û
⊥ (2.7)
Using the unit vectors as defined, p can be decomposed as
p = pxû
‖ + pyû
⊥ + p⊥ (2.8)
where p⊥ is the component of p that is perpendicular to the plane defined by u and vi.













where k = py
px
. Notice that the first term is equivalent to a well-defined probability (Eq.
1.172). We require the second term to be small since the deviation from well-defined should
be small. Since we have already required that v⊥i be small, we need only place restrictions
on k.
2.1.3 Bounds on k
For the purposes of this subsection, we will work in the plane defined by u and vi. Define
the angle between u and the projection of p into the plane to be θ. Define the length of
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the projection of p into the plane to be pxy. Using basic trigonometry, we get
py = pxysinθ (2.10)
px = pxycosθ (2.11)
Therefore, k can be written in a form that is dependent on only one variable, as follows:
k = tanθ (2.12)
As θ tends towards ±π
2
, k tends to infinity. Therefore, to ensure that the second term of
(2.9) is small, we require that k be finite. Assume it to be a property of the state space
for p that there exists some 0 < θmax. Clearly, |θmax| < π2 in order for k to be finite. So θ
is bounded as follows:
− π
2




The k corresponding to θmax will be denoted as kmax. Further bounds can be placed on k
by the state space of the physical theory. For our purposes, it is sufficient that k is finite.
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2.1.4 Q factor



















































Since v⊥i is very small (as is implied by the fact that vi and u are nearly parallel) and k is






































































Notice that the first term is equivalent to the definition of entropy where u ‖ vi and that
SΛ reduces to this definition when v⊥i = 0. That is, when u ‖ vi (or equivalently, v⊥i = 0)



































Using kmax as defined in the previous section, we can regard kmaxQ as a kind of correction
to the causally-biased entropy. Then, to leading order
S − kmaxQ ≤ SΛ ≤ S + kmaxQ (2.18)
2.1.5 Understanding Q
Q is an entirely new quantity with no direct classical analogue so understanding its physical
interpretation is a non-trivial matter. If we consider entropy as a measure of uncertainty,
then S is the measure of our uncertainty that the measurement FA in region A will yield
the specific outcome Y iA, given the data we have from the reference region P . Since our
reference region P is arbitrary, one way to view Q is that it measures how completely
the region P influences region A. In a definite causal structure, an immediate past region
would be the exclusive influence on our region of interest and Q would be zero. However, in
the causally-indefinite picture, we cannot require a priori that the reference region we have
chosen will be the exclusive influence on our region of interest. If there are no influences
on region A from outside region P , then the probability will be well-defined and Q will be
zero. But if there are influences on region A from outside region P , then the magnitude of
Q will reflect that.
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2.1.6 Using the Γ product










































− (rαAαP · r_AαP )
2
(r_AαP · r_AαP )2
(2.22)






rαA Γ(rαP ) r_A






rαA Γ(rαP ) rαA
r_A Γ(rαP ) r_A
−
(
rαA Γ(rαP ) r_A
r_A Γ(rαP ) r_A
)2
(2.24)
This allows us to completely specify the entropy of RA relative to a preparation RP in the
causaloid framework. It is straightforward to generalize this to define the joint entropy of
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RA and RB with reference to a “preparation” RP . Simply redefine u and vij as
vij = rαAαBαP (2.25)
u = r_A_BαP (2.26)
where















rαAαB Γ(rαP ) r_A_B






rαAαB Γ(rαP ) rαAαB
r_A_B Γ(rαP ) r_A_B
−
(
rαAαB Γ(rαP ) r_A_B
r_A_B Γ(rαP ) r_A_B
)2
(2.28)
In this manner, we can define causally-unbiased entropy in the causaloid framework for
any number of regions.
2.1.7 Conclusions
In a definite causal structure, the only thing required for a definition of entropy that is not
in an indefinite causal structure is an immediate past region. Since there is no reason in an
indefinite causal structure to choose any reference region over any other, we simply choose
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an arbitrary region. This ensures that we do not hold on to any pre-conceived notions of
space-time and its connection to causality. The definition of the causally-unbiased entropy
resulted in a correction to the causally-biased definition of entropy. In a sense, the Q factor
gives us an emergent idea of causality. It is a measure of the extent to which our region
of interest is causally connected to our reference (or “preparation”) region. If it is zero,
the traditional ideas of causality are recovered. The next step would be determining how
the Q factor could potentially be physically observed. To do so may require us to know
more of the theoretical and mathematical properties of Q. Which mathematical properties
of Shannon entropy hold for causally-unbiased entropy? What is the status of the Second
Law of Thermodynamics in an indefinite causal structure? To go about answering this, we
could consider how SΛ “evolves” along tubes through indefinite space-times.
2.2 Contextuality’s Generalization in Ontic Models
The study of ontological models has a peculiar history. A portion of the seminal papers
in the subject actually take the form of attempted ‘no-go’ theorems, intended to prove
that the subject was a dead-end. Beginning with the result of Von Neumann in [36]
which instead of the desired result (of proving what were at the time referred to as hidden
variables theories were incorrect) led to a rebuttal by Bohm with a counterexample[4], and
then the Kochen-Specker paper [16] which again purported to be a no-go result, but then
instead became an introduction to the concept (and necessity within ontological models)
of contextuality.
Contextuality in its basic sense is used to describe a theory in which the relationship
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of the observable results depend not solely on the states of the theory, but also depend
upon the set of what quantities are being observed. Classical mechanics is an example
of a non-contextual theory, best evidenced by the fact that the observables in classical
mechanics are also the states of the theory.
A picture of how such a property could exist in terms of the ontic models framework
emerges from considering three measurements of a quantum system. The first measurement
A commutes with the other two measurements we consider B and C (all of which take
values of either 0 or 1). Contextuality takes the form of the portions of the ontic space
corresponding to 0A0B ∪ 0A1B and 0A0C ∪ 0A1C not coinciding exactly. In terms of the
ontic models framework this can be expressed as
Supp [ξ (0A0B | λ, SAB)] ∪ Supp [ξ (0A1B | λ, SAB)] (2.29)
6= Supp [ξ (0A0C | λ, SAC)] ∪ Supp [ξ (0A1C | λ, SAC)] ,
for a deterministic ontological model. This means that we can’t use such a union to devise
a notion of the portion of the ontic space corresponding to 0A (or likewise for 1A) by
using either of these measurement configurations. We illustrate this in figure 2.2 where the
regions of support are labeled by the measurement outcomes.
We shall represent the central results from [16] and the extensions of the concept of
contextuality from [34] here, in the hopes of providing an introduction to the subject. We
will - where possible - reframe the results in the modern context of ontological models, and
the modern understanding of the impact of the results.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: The ontic space from measuring A with two different contexts
2.2.1 Kochen and Specker
The Kochen-Specker theorem was originally introduced in [16] as a no-go theorem for hid-
den variables approaches to quantum mechanics. As with Von Neumann’s no-go theorem,
there is an ‘out’ to the theorem, which then became a restriction on viable hidden variables
theories. As such the modern statement of the Kochen-Specker theorem is instead that
hidden variables theories must be contextual. We will outline the argument that underlies
the Kochen-Specker theorem, clarifying where the assumption of contextuality entered and
thus demonstrating the more modern form of the theorem.
The central objects within the construction of the Kochen-Specker theorem are the so
called ‘commeasurable observables’ which are a generalization of the commuting observ-
ables of standard quantum mechanics. Formally we give the definition that
A set of observables Ai (with i being elements of an indexing set) is said to
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be comeasurable if there exists an observable B and some set of measurable
functions fi (strictly speaking the functions must be Borel, but this is a require-
ment on the source and target spaces and not on the functions themselves) such
that for each i
Ai = fi(B) (2.30)
This definition then requires that commeasurability means what we would naively ex-
pect: by measuring B we can apply the different functions to our result to have measure-
ments for all of the Ai simultaneously. As measurability of functions is preserved under
addition, scalar multiplication and taking products of the functions, we can form what is
called a partial algebra.
A Partial Algebra is a set A over a field F, together with: addition, scalar
multiplication, a product from A × A to A, an identity element 1 ∈ A, and a
reflexive symmetric binary relation ./, subject to the following restrictions:
• a ./ 1 for all a ∈ A
• ./ is closed under all the operations (addition, scalar multiplication and
the product)
• Given three elements that each satisfy the binary relation with each other,
the values of the polynomials in the three elements form a commutative
algebra over the field F
We can moreover define homomorphisms between partial algebras:
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Given two partial algebras A and B over a field F, a map h : A→ B is a partial
algebra homomorphism if it is compatible with each of the operations and
with the binary relation. Namely, for a, b ∈ A, α, β ∈ F and a ./ b:
h(a) ./ h(b) (2.31)
h(αa+ βb) = αh(a) + βh(b) (2.32)
h(ab) = h(a)h(b) (2.33)
h(1A) = 1B (2.34)
Where 1A and 1B are the identity elements in A and B respectively.
Looking at a general commutative algebra K, we can see that we can construct from it
a partial algebra by taking the set of elements following the binary relation to be the full
space K ×K.
Working from these definitions we have a way of discussing the underlying ideas of the
hidden variables formulation of quantum mechanics. Kochen and Specker put forward the
premise that the underlying notion of a hidden variables theory is that the partial algebra
of observables of quantum mechanics can be embedded into a commutative algebra.
We can then present information necessary for the Kochen-Specker theorem. Beginning
with a hidden state space Λ we consider the set RΛ of all functions from the hidden
states to the real numbers, this space of functions forms a commutative algebra. It is
this commutative algebra that we embed the partial algebra of observables into. Each
hidden state λ ∈ Λ then defines a homomorphism from the partial algebra of quantum
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observables to the real numbers through an element of RΛ. We express this as follows: for
any observable A in the algebra of partial observables, we define the homomorphism h to
the real numbers through the element fA ∈ RΛ by h(A) = fA(λ).
This has within it an assumption of non-contextuality: consider three observables a, b, c
with a ./ b, a ./ c, but b not being comeasurable with c. As a and b are comeasurable,
there exists a single observable M such that both are determined from a measurement of
M , likewise as a and c are comeasurable, there exists as observable N from which they can
be determined. That the value of h(a) depends on fa(ω) and not on M or N , means that
the value is independent of the context in which it is measured.
The primary result of [16] then takes the following form
There exist physical systems for which such a homomorphism cannot exist. As
a result, the only valid hidden variable theories are contextual.
We will construct the counter example as follows: consider the problem of measuring
the square of the spin of a spin-1 object. From standard quantum mechanics we know




z are co-measurable as they commute. We likewise know that for a
spin-1 system the sum of the values of these three observables must be 2 (in natural units).
Extending from the fact that these objects only can have values of 0 or 1 we can reach the
conclusion that for any assignment of values to the three observables only one can have
a value of 0. We can also extend this to any triple of squared spin observables which are
mutually orthogonal (and also therefore co-measurable).
We can then consider the following problem: for a non-contextual hidden variables
theory there must exist a homomorphism which assigns values to all possible sets of these
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observables simultaneously. The issue is that there exists a set of observables of this form
so that there is no assignment of values to the directions that can be made without contra-
dicting the requirement that only one of the three values of a set of mutually orthogonal
can be 0.
The particular proof of the existence of such a set of directions is done by demonstrating
that there exists a graph which is realizable on a sphere in the following sense: the points
of the graph correspond to points on a sphere, and edges of the graph correspond to the
points they connect being orthogonal. A trio of mutually orthogonal points then takes the
form of a triangle within such a graph. If there exists a homomorphism then we should be
able to label the vertices of any realizable graph with values 0 or 1 such that:
• No edge connects two vertices labeled with 0
• No triangle contains three 1s.
In particular, there exists a (rather complicated) graph which is proven in [16] to be
realizable which does not admit a homomorphism. The existence of this graph gives us
the desired contradiction: we therefore cannot construct a hidden variable theory which is
non-contextual and gives a consistent value assignment to the observables for this scenario.
Examining the form of this proof gives a natural way of seeing how contextuality pro-
vides the ‘out’ for the no-go theorem as it was originally presented. Allowing for contex-
tuality reduces our problem to only needing to construct a homomorphism which simul-
taneously assigns values for a set of commeasurable observables - in this case, a triangle.
Assigning such a valuation in this case while respecting the requirements defined above is
trivial.
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It is interesting to note that the form of the Kochen Specker theorem does not prove
that non-contextual hidden variable theories are always inconsistent. The statement of the
result is not broad: it only states that there are physical systems which cannot consistently
be described by non-contextual hidden variable theories. It is therefore possible that we
can consistently characterize many physical system by using non-contextual hidden variable
theories.
It was pointed out in [12] that there are three implicit restrictions within the Kochen-
Specker theorem. From the perspective of ontic models we can see that the theorem
only applies to outcome deterministic theories. Looking at the structure of the proof we
can also see that it only considers projective-valued measures (PVMs) and not POVMs
in general. Lastly it relies on the fact that the Hilbert space is 3 or more dimensional
through the fact that the projector is not uniquely defined for more than 2 dimensions.
To see this we observe that in 2 dimensions there is a unique perpendicular to any given
direction, whereas in 3 or more dimensions we have an infinite number of ways to choose
the perpendiculars. In constructing a PVM we construct the context of the measurement,
and thus in 2 dimensions there is no ability to form a contextual measurement.
2.2.2 Spekkens
The work done in [34] extends the notions of contextuality from those introduced in [16]
in three major ways. The first is to extend the idea to non-deterministic ontological
models, the second is to extend the idea of contextuality to a similar property regarding
preparations and lastly to extend the idea of contextuality to measurements associated with
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positive-operator valued measures (POVMs). These extensions are evident in the form by
which we have constructed our formalism for ontological models, but we will nonetheless
go through each in kind.
The extension to non-deterministic ontological models is encapsulated in how we con-
struct the functions associated with measurement in our ontological theory. In an ontologi-
cal model which is deterministic the function ξ gives a probability of 1 to the measurement
result corresponding to the ontological state and a probability of 0 to all others. By allowing
ξ to take the form of a general probability distribution over the measurement outcomes,
we achieve the extension of the notion of contextuality to non-deterministic ontological
models simply through the allowance of ξ to depend on the measurement procedure.
Preparation contextuality is the extension of the idea of contextuality to the possibility
that the means by which a state is prepared could influence the probability distribution µ
over the ontic space. This possibility is reflected in our general framework through allowing
µ to depend on SP the preparation procedure for the state.
The last extension - to POVMs - follows from the extension to non-deterministic on-
tological models, along with our framework having the allowance for general measurement
procedures. Thus all of the information for this extension is contained in ξ taking the form
of ξ (k| λ, SM).
No Go Theorems
The results in [34] include no-go theorems in two dimensions for both preparation contex-
tuality and also one for measurement contextuality for POVMs. We will replicate both of
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these here.
Both proofs make use of the same set of six two dimensional vectors, and in many ways
are reminiscent of the proof from Kochen and Specker in their use of pairs of orthogonal
vectors to construct contradictory statements. We first give the set of six vectors:
va = (1, 0) (2.35)




































We can see that for any letter pairing the inner product between them is 0. We can then
construct the rank 1 density operators and the projective measurement operators associated
to each of these vectors (these are the same), we will label them σ and D respectively. We
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find for these






















































The orthogonality of the letter pairings of these matrices follows from the orthogonality of
the corresponding vectors.
σaσA = DaDA = 0 (2.37)
σbσB = DbDB = 0
σcσC = DcDC = 0
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Lastly we can construct the sum of the density or projective measurement operators labeled
by the same letter in upper and lower case, along with the sums of the triple of lower case
















































































We can now consider the question of preparation contextuality. The proof of preparation
contextuality (similarly to the one in [16]) is by contradiction, so we will assume that our
probability distributions are not functions of the preparation method. Next we observe
that for two preparation procedures to be distinguishable their two probability distributions
should have no common support on the ontic space, that is
µ(λ)µ′(λ) = 0 ∀λ. (2.39)
Now, consider six preparation procedures corresponding to the pure states defined by the
vectors from equation 2.35, which we’ll call Pa through PC . These preparations would give
us the density operators from equation 2.36. We can also consider new preparations PaA,
PbB, PcC , Pabc and PABC , by allowing us to create a preparation corresponding to each of
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the subscripts with even probability. These mixed state procedures would all correspond
to the same density matrix 1
2
. In the ontic model framework each of the procedures would
correspond to a probability distribution in the ontic state, which we label µa through µABC .
As each of the pairs of states for each letter correspond to completely distinguishable
results, we know that the probability distributions must obey
µa(λ)µA(λ) = 0 (2.40)
µb(λ)µB(λ) = 0
µc(λ)µC(λ) = 0.
Additionally, in order for the ontic model framework to be consistent the mixed state proce-
dures must correspond to a convex combination of the constituent preparation procedures’s










































We now add the implication of our theory being non-contextual. A non-contextual theory
would mean that different preparation procedures corresponding to the same observable
state should correspond to the same probability distribution over the ontic state space,
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We now must ask the question of if we can satisfy equations 2.40 and 2.42. The three
equations of products constrain us the choosing three of our distributions to be 0, and
attempting to implement those in equations 2.42 gives us all of the other distributions to
be zero. This means that the only solution is the trivial one, which isn’t a permissible
distribution in our framework, yielding a contradiction. We thus get a no-go result for two
dimensional non-contextual ontic theories.
We can now use much of this proof in constructing the proof of measurement contex-
tuality for POVMs for a two dimensional system. We can consider three measurements
Ma = {Da, DA}, Mb = {Db, DB} and Mc = {Dc, DC}, with the D’s as defined above. As
each of the pairs of the D’s span the space and are orthogonal, we get that the sum of the
pairs is the identity (as mentioned in equation 2.38) and we have that the products of the
elements of the pairs are zero (much as we had for the density operators in the previous
proof). Putting this into our ontological framework, we get that each of the measurements
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has two corresponding probability distributions over the ontic space, for example Ma has
two functions ξa (λ) and ξA (λ) providing the probability of receiving results corresponding
to va or vA for each value of λ. As these are mutually exclusive, and exhaustive options,
we get that
ξa (λ) + ξA (λ) = 1 (2.43)
ξb (λ) + ξB (λ) = 1
ξc (λ) + ξC (λ) = 1.
We also make one further assumption: that for PVMs (like those that we have considered
so far) we have outcome determinism. This means that for each λ we have a unique
assignment of the result of a measurement. In our binary situation, this means that one
of the pair will be 0 and the other 1 for each letter pairing. We can represent this as
ξa (λ) ξA (λ) = 0 (2.44)
ξb (λ) ξB (λ) = 0
ξc (λ) ξC (λ) = 0.
We can now construct a POVM from these PVMs by considering a random process where
we perform one of Ma, Mb and Mc, each with equal probability, additionally we don’t
record the details of which process was performed (only recording whether a lower case




















. In our framework these measurement proce-
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dures must represented by convex sums of the probability distributions of the measure-






















However, we have forms for the matrices Dx in the first definition of M , and so we know








. As we assume non-contextuality, our
probability distributions over the ontic space for the POVM should not depend on our
preparation method. We should then be able to achieve the same probability distribution
by any procedure which assigns equal probabilities to two results independent of the ontic
state. This gives us that our distributions must each be equal to 1
2
























We now can get our contradiction: the equations labeled 2.46 and the equations labeled
2.43 and 2.44 do not have a consistent solution, and so we have that for two dimensions
we must have measurement contextuality for POVMs.
It should be noted here that these results only apply to ontological models constructed
in such a framework. This should be contrasted to the Kochen-Specker theorem which
applies to any realist construction of quantum mechanics.
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2.2.3 Harrigan & Rudolph
In [12] contextuality was examined further from the perspective of ontic models. They refer
to the contextuality of section 2.2.1 as traditional contextuality and define it as follows:
A model is traditionally contextual if it is both out outcome deterministic and
if there exists at least one projection operator such that measurement outcome
is dependent on the specific PVM used.
This definition is intended to contrast with a generalized definition of context which
they give as:
The context of an outcome is all of the measurement settings that do not effect
the statistics of the outcome.
From this view point we can give an alternate definition of measurement contextuality:
A model is measurement contextual if the indicator function (ξ) is not unique
to a POVM element. Rather it depends on some additional information as well
(i.e. context).
Likewise we then express preparation contextuality
A model is preparation contextual if the epistemic state µ is not unique to the
density matrix ρ, rather depending on other information.
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These two types of contextuality are independent, in that one can have one, the other,
both or neither.
The last observation that we put forward from [12] is that within the ontic models frame-
work there are two ways to achieve traditional contextuality. The first - ξ-contextuality
- gives rise to traditional contextuality by varying the support for the indicator function
as measurement settings change. The second - λ-contextuality - gives rise to traditional
contextuality by instead varying the ontic state of the system as the measurement setting
changes. The key is that in either case it forces that how λ is in the support of ξ is
dependent on the settings (i.e. the context).
2.3 Deficiency in Ontic Models
The strength of the ontic models framework lies in its ability to discover properties of
models of quantum mechanics which would not be clear when looking at these models in
the standard formalism. Contextuality is one such property, but in [12] another property,
termed deficiency, was put forward.
If ∃ a pure quantum state |ψ〉 such that
Supp [µ (λ | ψ, Sp)] ⊂ Supp [ξ (ψ | λ, SM)] (2.47)
for some choice of Sp and SM , then the ontological model is deficient.
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Just from its obscure nature this is an interesting property to consider, and one that
might not arise naturally in the language of a particular model (rather than the general
ontic model framework). We will examine this concept in two steps: First, we will attempt
to provide an understanding of deficiency as a property and secondly, we will present a
theorem from [12] demonstrating that traditional contextuality implies deficiency for ontic
models.
Deficiency, as laid out formally, is rather abstract and so the meaning of it can easily
be missed. The first thing to note is that it is a statement of existence, and so need only
be true for a single ψ along with a single pairing of measurement setup and preparation
method. With this in mind, the left hand side of the subset statement then speaks to the
set of ontic states which the system could be in if prepared in the state ψ with method Sp,
whereas the right hand side speaks to the set of ontic states the system could be in and
still be measured to be the state ψ with method SM . That one of these could be a proper
subset of the other implies that our measurement method and preparation methods are
essentially giving different definitions of the state ψ in terms of the ontic states. We will
discuss the implications of this in section 2.3.1.
Theorem 1. Any ontic model that is traditionally contextual must be deficient.
Proof
We divide the proof into two parts. First we address outcome indeterministic models. Sup-
pose for a contradiction that our model is not deficient. Then for all ψ and choices of SM
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and SP we have
Supp [µ (λ | ψ, Sp)] = Supp [ξ (ψ | λ, SM)] . (2.48)
As ψ should always be measured to be itself we require
∫
dλ µ (λ | ψ) ξ (ψ | λ) = 1. (2.49)
However
∫
µ (λ | ψ) dλ = 1, (2.50)
and so equation 2.49 can only be satisfied if
ξ (ψ | λ) = 1∀λ ∈ Supp [µ (λ | ψ)] . (2.51)
This means though that all indicator functions for all ψ are deterministic indicator func-
tions, which gives us a contradiction with our assumption of outcome indeterminism.
We now assume our model is outcome deterministic, traditionally contextual and as-
sume for a contradiction that our model is also not deficient. We thus have that for a given
SP
Supp [µ (λ | ψ, Sp)] = Supp [ξ (ψ | λ, SM)]∀SM . (2.52)
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We can conclude from this that for any choices of ψ, SM and S
′
M that we have
Supp [ξ (ψ | λ, SM)] = Supp [ξ (ψ | λ, S ′M)] . (2.53)
This means that our measurements will not be contextual for any choice of ψ giving us a
contradiction and completing our proof.
We note that our proof differs slightly from [12] since they do not note that the negation
of deficiency requires that equality hold for all ψ rather than for a single ψ. The structure
of the proof is not impacted, rather this just closes a logical gap in their presentation.
2.3.1 Measurement, Preparation and Deficiency
The examination of deficiency as a property of ontic models lends itself to discussing
the division between measurement methods and preparation methods in the ontic mod-
els framework. Even after dissecting the definition of deficiency step by step it can be
difficult to fully understand, however this can be alleviated by treating measurement and
preparation in a more even handed fashion.
Preparation methods which result in a state ψ in many ways must be considered a
measurement as well: that we are preparing a system in a given state means that in some
fashion we have measured the system to be in that particular state. If we only consider
models which are blind to our intentions or labeling of processes, we can then consider
all preparations to in fact be measurements. We can then assume that the measurement
settings and preparation methods are part of the same set, and treat them equivalently.
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Returning to the notion of deficiency, we note that we can use this consistent treatment
of measurement and preparation to clarify it. As deficiency is only the requirement of the
existence of some choice ψ, SM , Sp which obeys the set relation, we can exclude from it
all such choices where SM and Sp are identical. The argument for this exclusion is one of
consistency - appealing again to the notion that our model is blind to our intentions. Once
we’ve excluded this case we can see that deficiency relates very much to the concepts of
measurement and preparation contextuality. Deficiency becomes the statement that the
ontic states associated with a state ψ are dependent upon the method used to prepare the
state (or equivalently to measure it). In particular we get that there exists some ψ, SM
and S ′M
Supp [ξ (ψ | λ, SM)] ⊂ Supp [ξ (ψ | λ, S ′M)] , (2.54)
or equivalently that




λ | ψ, S ′p
)]
. (2.55)
These statements then imply the requirement that the model be both preparation and
measurement contextual if it is deficient and blind to our intentions with respect to whether
processes are measurements or preparations.
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2.4 Nelsons Mechanics vs. Bohmian Mechanics
Nelsons mechanics and Bohmian mechanics are often compared to one another due to their
similar structure: both attempt to formulate quantum mechanics in terms of a modified
classical dynamics. Despite this similarity, the two theories produce very different phys-
ical pictures: Bohmian mechanics has a quantum potential which is determined by the
solutions of the Schrodinger equation, whereas Nelson’s mechanics instead assumes only
Brownian motion with a diffusion constant proportional to ~. In section 2.4.1 we will re-
view the derivation of Bohmian mechanics, and then in section 2.4.2 we will compare the
applicability and meaning of these theories.
2.4.1 Bohmian Mechanics
Bohm’s goals for his mechanics [4, 5] were to obtain a theory which gave a realist description
of individual ensembles (instead of for distributions) and to counter two assumptions of
the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics that he objected to. The objections
were to the assumption that the wave function is a complete description of reality and the
assumption that measurement is an inherently unpredictable process. These objections
were on the basis of the fact that the assumptions did not give rise to a set of predictions
which were uniquely determined by having chosen these assumptions. Here we reproduce
Bohm’s derivation.
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∇2ψ + V (x)ψ, (2.56)
where ψ is still considered a complex function over space. From here we break the function
























We now introduce P which in standard quantum mechanics would be interpreted as the
probability density from the quality
P (x) = R2(x). (2.60)





































+∇ · (P~v(x)) = 0. (2.64)
Bohm then observed that the term in ~2 could be interpreted as an addition to the classical



















We then have that S is the solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation for a probability
distribution subject to the potential V + U , along with conservation of probability.
These equations can also be used to give equations of motion for individual particles
possessing precise positions and momenta. From this we get that a particle is subject to a














where the initial particle momentum is related to the wave function of quantum mechanics
through
~p = ∇S(x), (2.68)
though this fact is not necessary for the use of the modified Newton equation.
The resulting mechanics is then deterministic which presents us with a question as to
how it could reproduce the results of quantum mechanics. The solution to this issue is
through uncontrollable disturbances from measurement devices: the inaccuracies inherent
in measurement restrict our knowledge to probability distributions. Though we have exact
trajectories of particles, because we can never measure those trajectories exactly without
disturbance this is then characterized as a hidden variable model.
The picture of Bohmian mechanics that comes from this derivation is that of classical
mechanics with the addition of a quantum potential that is determined by the solutions of
the Schrodinger equation. The corollary of this is that we’re left with a modern equivalent
of the question of why gravitational mass and inertial mass are the same: why is it that
we observe the probability density to be equal to the square of the magnitude of the wave
function? In Bohmian mechanics there is no a priori reason that these two must be equal.
2.4.2 Comparing the two mechanics
Equipped with the two derivations from sections 1.1 and 2.4.1 we now contrast the form
of the two theories. Before we proceed in contrasting their implications it is interesting to
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note that the motivations behind the two theories are very different: Bohm’s mechanics
is motivated by a desire for a realist description of the universe, whereas Nelson’s was
motivated by a desire to apply a recent mathematical advance. Despite Nelson’s differing
motivations he still takes a similar view that there should exist an underlying reality that
leads to quantum mechanics. It is to keep these realist structures that both theories share
a common starting point in newtonian mechanics, and both attempt not to stray from
these roots.
The most striking difference between them is the role of the Schrodinger equation in
their derivations. Bohmian mechanics not only assumes the Schrodinger equation, but it
then requires that the solution to the equation and its derivative are combined to makeup
a potential. Nelsons mechanics instead assumes only diffusion at the level of Planck’s
constant, and arrives at the conclusion that a probability density under these conditions
gives rise to the Schrodinger equation.
The substantive difference in these two theories comes from a subtle difference: Bohmian
mechanics assigns to the trajectories the role of a hidden variable, whereas Nelson’s me-
chanics considers them to be accessible but inherently random. The hidden variables in
Nelson’s mechanics are not made manifest in the theory: the excitations of the hidden
variables relax on a time scale which is small compared to the time scale of the trajectories
and so they are in effect averaged out to noise-like fluctuations.
Due to these differences in structure the two theories may have very different appli-
cations within quantum foundations. In particular Bohmian mechanics acts as a viable
candidate for a realist theory of quantum mechanics, whereas Nelson’s mechanics instead
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tells us that a theory whose hidden variables have dynamics on sufficiently small time
scales can lead to probability distributions evolving according to the schrodinger equation.
It is interesting to look at the criticisms that have been made of Nelson’s mechanics
in [37, 38] and see whether they apply to Bohmian mechanics as well. The criticisms of
Nelson’s mechanics relate to the need for the S in the breakdown of ψ to be multivalued
in certain situations. For instance where the wavefunction is a solution to a problem with
angular momentum and S can therefore take on values differing by integer multiples of
the azimuthal angle, we then have that the wavefunction is only single valued if these
differences are multiples of 2π (which results in multiplication by a factor of 1). What we
then have is a constraint on what values of S will give viable solutions to the Schrodinger
equation. In these situations we have a problem in Nelson’s mechanics: there is no reason
that we should assume our solutions also observe this constraint, and so in general we get
behaviour which does not correspond to a solution of the Schrodinger equation. On the
other hand, as the direction of implication is reversed in Bohmian mechanics - we begin
with solutions to the Schrodinger equation and then derive from them the trajectories -




3.1 Compatibilities and Incompatibilities
As we’ve shown in chapter 2, each of these frameworks can be applied in studying dif-
ferent concepts. What we now want to question is whether the advances within each of
these frameworks can be transferred to the others, or whether the choices that went into
constructing each framework mean that their results are inapplicable elsewhere.
Both the causaloid and ontic models share a common obstacle to progress: having
sacrificed a description of reality in terms of variables based upon our experience and
observations for a description in terms of mathematical states. This obstacle is manifest
in different ways for each of the two theories. As the causaloid doesn’t have an assumption
of realism its obstacle is solely computation complexity: that to produce any physical
calculation could take an arbitrary amount of effort. The ontic models framework is more
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constrained than this. It is troubled both by the issue of complexity, but is also constrained
by its assumption of realism. This means that it cannot be used to progress to a deeper
description of reality: an assumption of the model is that it is impossible to create a
description of its variables.
Given these considerations as a background we will look at the notion of contextuality
in section 3.1.1, which we discussed originally in the context of ontic models. Using the
other subjects as a reference we examine whether the notion of contextuality can have
physical meaning.
3.1.1 Physical Contextuality
The concept of contextuality introduced in section 2.2 is used to describe a property of a
theory, not a property of reality itself. We will examine the consequences of relaxing this
fact while attempting to construct a consistent description of reality.
For reality to be contextual, there would have to exist situations where any consistent
description would exhibit contextuality. We use this requirement to distinguish physical
contextuality from a contextual description of non-contextual reality. We also require such
situations to not be those which are contextual simply due to a poor choice of the division
between observer and observed.
The second requirement of physical contextuality is not a trivial escape which would
render the definition worthless. It is possible that such a better choice of division may
not exist. Consider for an illustration the problem of the observer in quantum general
relativity[6] here the object being observed is the entirety of the universe, and so there is
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no way to separate the observer from the observed. There is a contradiction here though: in
this picture there is no notion of repeatability or guarantee of relationship between different
measurements. We then have a complex question: could we observe something which is
actually physically contextual? For the sake of illustration this would mean that there
is some system which we could take multiple choices of simultaneous measurements (say
A,B,C or A,B′, C ′) and the choice of which measurements are taken influences the results
of the measurements. The complication here is that we’ve presupposed that we know
that we can simultaneously take these measurements. In quantum mechanics we have a
definition of what it means for observables to be simultaneously measurable: they must
commute. How do we know that two measurements should in fact be comeasurable? The
reality is that we cannot. Given any scenario where we believe two sets of measurements
with a common element should be co-measurable and find that the result is contextual,
we have to accept the alternative possibility that there is in fact some physical phenomena
which prevents the measurement sets from being comeasurable. This gives us another
possibility: any observed physical contextuality could instead be replaced by a contextual
theory with different physical phenomena.
We should then ask ourself what types of phenomena could lead to apparent physical
contextuality. To answer this we must ask ourselves what conditions would make us believe
that two things might not have influence upon one another. The most obvious answer to
this question is distance: if two objects are sufficiently distant we would think that all forces
between them should fall below levels at which they could influence one another. Any
phenomenon then which acted irrespective of distance would then potentially be confused
with physical contextuality.
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In a situation where we have non-local phenomena giving rise to apparent physical
contextuality, we are faced with a greater hurdle: we cannot repair such an issue by
enlarging our observed system as there is no guarantee that any such enlargement would
dilute the influence of the non-local effects. Here instead we are left with two options.
The first option is to move to a framework which describes reality not in the terms
which we are used to, but instead moves to a description in terms of what parts of the
universe can have influence on others. The causaloid framework (see section 1.3) is an
example of a direct attempt at such a description, and taken in a broader context so is
the ontic models framework (see section 1.2) which never makes reference to a space (or
space-time) description, replacing it instead with an ontic space of be-ables.
The alternative option is to accept that reality is making it clear that one cannot probe
to deeper levels. We must then accept either an inherent connectedness between all things
- which gives rise to a hidden variable theory like Bohmian mechanics (see section 2.4.1)
with its all-knowing quantum potential - or an inherent randomness - which gives rise to
a stochastic theory like Nelson’s mechanics (see section 1.1). It is interesting here to recall
that Nelson’s mechanics and Bohmian mechanics share a common equilibrium description
of reality, meaning that these two options may have more commonality than assumed.
These conclusions leave us with interesting questions concerning the value of research
into contextuality. If any physical meaning of contextuality can be replaced with another
theory, is there any possible result that can emerge from its study?
85
3.2 Conclusions
In this thesis I have presented a broad perspective of quantum foundations in the attempt
to show both the benefits and the pitfalls of the existence of a large variety of approaches to
the subject. The breadth of the approaches to quantum foundations certainly has allowed
for many successes, but the vast difference in these approaches means that many of these
results cannot be applied to other approaches.
In chapter 1 I outlined three different frameworks that fall under the general heading
of quantum foundations: ontic models, Nelson’s mechanics, and the causaloid. Then in
chapter 2 I discussed applications of these frameworks in studying entropy, contextuality
and in understanding other approaches to quantum foundations. Lastly, in section 3.1.1 I
presented an argument - rooted in the broader view of having examined multiple approaches
to quantum foundations - that the property of contextuality may not have any physical
meaning.
The study of quantum foundations has advanced significantly from its early origins, but
I believe that until the field begins to learn what results are transferrable from different
frameworks and which are simply artifacts of a particular construction, it will fail to live
up to its promises.
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